Louisiana Law Review
Volume 57
Number 2 Winter 1997

Article 8

2-1-1997

Louisiana Went For It: A New Thirty-Day Waiting Period for
Targeted Solicitation of Clients
N. Gregory Smith
Louisiana State University Law Center, greg.smith@law.lsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
N. Gregory Smith, Louisiana Went For It: A New Thirty-Day Waiting Period for Targeted Solicitation of
Clients, 57 La. L. Rev. (1997)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol57/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Louisiana Went For It: A New Thirty-Day Waiting Period
for Targeted Solicitation of Clients
N. Gregory Smith

I. INTRODUCTION

On March 1, 1996, Louisiana lawyers became subject to a new rule on
targeted solicitation of clients. Prior to March 1, it was perfectly ethical for a
Louisiana lawyer to mail a written solicitation to an accident victim immediately

after the accident. No longer. As a result of the Louisiana Supreme Court's
recent amendment to Rule 7.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct,' a lawyer
must now wait thirty days before mailing such a solicitation.'
For nearly twenty years, the trend has been to expand the ability of lawyers
to engage in advertising and forms of solicitation. The trend did not arise out

of enthusiasm for advertising and solicitation on the part of bar governors or
disciplinary authorities. It arose out of decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court ruled that lawyers

who advertise or engage in certain forms of solicitation enjoy a significant level
of First Amendment protection. Thus, the Court has permitted lawyers to engage
in truthful advertising of basic services,' to hold themselves out as specialists in

different areas of the law," and to send targeted advertisements to persons
known to be in need of particular legal services Ethics rules in Louisiana, and
around the nation, were modified to reflect the new constitutional wisdom.'
The amendment to Louisiana Rule 7.2 represents a retreat from the recent
trend of permissibility in lawyer advertising and solicitation, but is is a retreat
that parallels constitutional developments. In FloridaBar v. Went For It, Inc.,'
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1. La. R.S. 37, Ch. 4. App., art. 16 (1988 and Supp. 1996) (hereinafter Louisiana's Rules of
Professional Conduct will be referenced as "Rule
").
2. Rule 7.2 (Supp. Sept. 1996).
3. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S. Ct. 2691, reh 'g denied, 434 U.S.
881, 98 S.Ct. 242 (1977).
i
4. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 S. Ct. 2281
(1990).
5. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Wood Brown, Lawyer Advertising: Where We Were, How Far We've Come,
Where We're Going, 39 La. B.J. 453, 457 (1992) (Louisiana rules on advertising and solicitation were
drawn with the Supreme Court cases in mind).
7. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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a 1995 decision, the United States Supreme Court upheld a Florida rule that
prohibited attorneys from mailing targeted advertisements to accident victims
within thirty days of the accident. The Court concluded that the rule did not
impermissibly abridge the free speech rights of Florida lawyers.8 Only a few
months after the Went ForIt decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court approved
the change to Rule 7.2.
This article examines the text and scope of amended Rule 7.2. It discusses
the constitutionality of Louisiana's new thirty-day waiting period. And it
speculates on the impact of the new rule on lawyer behavior.
II. RULES OLD AND NEW
A. The Context ofthe Rule
Rule 7.2, entitled "Direct Contact With Prospective Clients," is located in
a section ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conduct entitled "Information About Legal
Services." The other rules in this section are 7.1, entitled "Communications
Concerning A Lawyer's Services," 7.3, entitled "Firm Names and Letterheads,"
and 7.4, entitled "Communications of Fields of Practice."
The most important of these rules is Rule 7.1. It sets forth the general
proposition, relevant to each of the other rules, that a "lawyer shall not make or
permit to be made a false, misleading or deceptive communication about the
lawyer, the lawyer's services or the services of the lawyer's firm." Rule 7.1,
then, regulates the content ofcommunications about lawyer services. In contrast,
Rule 7.2 deals mainly with the form of the communication itself. It is hostile to
some forms of "solicitation."
B. The Old Rule
Prior to its 1996 amendment, Louisiana Rule 7.2 generally prohibited "inperson" solicitation or "person to person" telephone solicitation by the lawyer or
by individuals acting for the lawyer, where a significant motive for the
solicitation was the lawyer's pecuniary gain. However, the rule did permit a
lawyer to solicit family members or individuals with whom the lawyer had a
prior professional relationship. It also allowed a lawyer to solicit potential clients
by sending written or recorded communications to persons known to be in need
of legal services of a particular kind. If the lawyer followed the applicable rules,
he or she could actually "target" individuals who were known to need legal

services.
The prior rule stated in its entirety:
(a) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment in person, by
person to person verbal telephone contact or through others acting at his

8. • 115 S. Ct. at 2381.
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request or on his behalf from a prospective client with whorn the lawyer
has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
(b) A lawyer shall not initiate targeted solicitation, in the form of a
written or recorded communication, of a person or persons known to
need legal services of a particular kind provided by the lawyer in a
particular matter for the purpose of obtaining professional umployment
unless such communication complies with the requirements set forth
below and is not otherwise in violation of these rules:
(i) A copy or recording of each such communication and a record of
when and where it was used shall be kept by the lawyer using such
communication for three (3) years after its last dissemination.
(ii) Such communication shall state clearly the name of at least one
member in good standing of the Association responsible for its content.
(iii) In the case of a written communication:
(A) such communication shall not resemble a legal pleading,
notice, contract, or other legal document and shall not be delivered via
registered mail, certified mail or other restricted form of delivery; and
(B) the top of each page of such communication and the lower left
comer of the face of the envelope in which the communication is
enclosed shall be plainly marked "ADVERTISEMENT" in print size at
least as large as the largest print used in the written communication,
provided that if the written communication is in the form of a selfmailing brochure or pamphlet, the "ADVERTISEMENT" mark shall
appear above the address panel of the brochure or pamphLet.
(iv) In the case of a recorded communication, such communication
shall be identified specifically as an advertisement at the beginning of
the recording, at the end of the recording and on any envelope in which
it is transmitted in accordance with the requirements of subparagraph
(iii)(B) above.
(v) If the communication is prompted by a specific. occurrence
involving or affecting the intended recipient of the communication or a
family member of the intended recipient, such communication shall
disclose how the lawyer obtained the information prompting the
communication.
(c) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, a lawyer shall not
solicit professional employment from a prospective client through any
means, even when not otherwise prohibited by these rules, if:
(i) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to
be solicited; or
(ii) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, harassment, fraud, overreaching, intimidation or undue influence.
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(d)A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services; provided, however, that a lawyer may
pay the reasonable and customary costs of an advertisement or
communication not in violation of these rules.9
C. The New Rule
The 1996 amendment to Rule 7.2 focused only on part (b) of the rule, which
deals with targeted solicitation of clients by means of written or recorded
communications. All other portions of the rule remain in effect. The revisions
to part (b) are as follows:
(b) In instances where there is no family or prior professional
relationship, a lawyer shall not initiate targeted solicitation, in the form
of a written or recorded communication, of a person or persons known
to need legal services of a particular kind provided by the lawyer in a
particular matter for the purpose of obtaining professional employment
unless such communication complies with the requirements set forth
below and is not otherwise in violation of these rules.
(iii) In the case of a written communication:
(C) if the communication concerns an action for personal injury or
wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving
the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that
person, such communication shall not be initiated by the lawyer unless
the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing
of the communication.' 0
The key change, of course, was the addition of subpart (C), which sets forth the
new thirty-day waiting period for targeted solicitation letters.
D. The Scope of the New Rule
Although Rule 7.2(b) is concerned with both recorded and written
solicitations, the new thirty-day waiting period applies, by its terms, only to
"written communications." Moreover, it applies only to a limited category. of
written communications: those that are directly targeted at victims of accidents
or disasters or the relatives of those victims. Accordingly, lawyers may still
engage in a variety of targeted solicitations without waiting for any particular
period of time to pass. For example, if a lawyer learns that a debtor has recently
been sued in a foreclosure action, the lawyer may immediately send a targeted

9.
10.

Rule 7.2 (Supp. 1996).
Rule 7.2 (Supp. Sept. 1996).
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solicitation letter, or recording, to the debtor. If a lawyer learm that a consumer
has recently been defrauded by a merchant, the lawyer may immediately send a
targeted letter or recording to the consumer. It would seem, too, that a lawyer
could also immediately send a targeted solicitation letter to the victim of an
intentional crime," and might well do so if the suspected perpetrator is
someone who could pay civil damages.
One of the purposes of the new rule, no doubt, is to shield accident victims
and their relatives from unseemly solicitations by lawyers -during a time of
distress or grief. 2 But the rule does not bar all lawyer contacts with these
victims during the thirty-day period. It does not, for example, prohibit a lawyer
from an insurance company from contacting an accident victim, within thirty
days of the accident, in an effort to persuade the victim to accept an insurance
settlement. And, as will be discussed later in this article, 3 the rule does not
actually prohibit all solicitations by personal injury lawyers within the thirty-day
period.
III.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND TARGETED SOLICITATION

A. PreliminaryDevelopments
Not many years ago, it was unethical for American lawyers to engage in
most forms of advertising for clients.' Indeed, the tradition of the bar was that
lawyers belonged to a profession, not a money-grubbing trade, and that it was
inconsistent with professional norms for lawyers to announce their availability
to potential clients other than through business cards, legal directories, business
letterheads, and dignified signs on their office doors.' s
Those traditions were challenged in Bates v. State Bar o',Arizona,'" a 1977
decision by the United States Supreme Court. In that case, some Arizona
lawyers were disciplined for running a newspaper advertisement offering "legal

I1. The results of an intentional crime might seem "disastrous" to the victim, but, at least in
most cases, would probably not amount to the type of "disaster" the rule is intended to address.
However, some criminal acts, such as acts of terrorism or arson, might well bring about a qualifying
"disaster."
12. Florida has a similar 30-day waiting period rule. In arguments over the rule in Florida Bar
v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995), the Florida Bar contended that the rule was supported
by "a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their
loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers." Id. at 2376.
13.

See Infra part V.

14. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering; 957-58 (2d ed. 1994).
Canon 27 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics (1908) declared: "It is unprofessional to solicit
professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by p'-rsonal communications
or interviews not warranted by personal relations."
15. See Hazard, supra note 14, at 957. See also ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon
27 (1908). Louisiana's rules were stricter than the rules in some other states. See Brown, supra note
6.
16.

433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881, 98 S. Ct. 242 (1977).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

services at very reasonable fees," and listing the fees for several routine
services. 17 The Court concluded that the advertisement constituted commercial
speech, and was entitled to First Amendment protection.' 8 While advertising
that is "false, deceptive, or misleading" may be subject to restraint, 19 and, as
with other speech, would be subject to reasonable "time, place, and manner"
restrictions,2" the Court said that the State could not "prevent the publication in
a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement concerning the availability and
terms of routine legal services. '
Advertising was now acceptable. But what about direct, in-person solicitation
of clients? The Court took a look at that issue in 1978, in Ohralikv.OhioState Bar
Association," and concluded that the traditional prohibitions against such
solicitation would survive a First Amendment attack. Ohralik, the attorney in that
case, had visited one accident victim in the hospital, and another in her home, and
had directly solicited representation engagements. He was suspended from the
practice oflaw by order of the Ohio Supreme Court. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, stating:
In-person solicitation by a lawyer of remunerative employment is a
business transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate
component. While this does not remove the speech from the protection
of the First Amendment ... it lowers the level of appropriate judicial
scrutiny.
[U]nlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information
and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation
may exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without
providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection. 3
Mr. Ohralik conceded that the State had a compelling interest in preventing
aspects of solicitation that involved "fraud, undue influence, intimidation,
overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious conduct."24 The Court, however,
thought that the "efficacy of the State's effort to prevent such harm to prospective
clients would be substantially diminished if, having proved a solicitation in
circumstances like those of this case, the State were required in addition to prove
actual injury.""' Accordingly, the Court concluded that it was not unreasonable,

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

433 U.S. at 385, 97 S. Ct. at 2710.
Id. at 365, 381, 384, 97 S. Ct. at 2700, 2708-09.
Id. at 383, 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
Id. at 384, 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
Id.
436 U.S. 447, 98 S. Ct. 1912, reh 'g denied, 439 U.S. 883, 99 S. Ct. 226 (1978).
436 U.S. at 457, 98 S. Ct. at 1919,
Id. at 462, 98 S. Ct. at 1921.

25.

Id. at 466, 98 S. Ct. at 1924.
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or unconstitutional, for a State to devise a "prophylactic rule" against in-person
solicitation. ' 6
Bates permitted lawyers to engage in truthful advertising. Ohralikconfirmed
that states could prohibit direct, in-person solicitation by attormeys, at least where
the motive for doing so was the lawyer's pecuniary gain. Between the holdings of
those cases was an unresolved issue: to what extent could states; prohibit lawyers
from engaging in written solicitation ofpotential clients who were known to be in
need ofparticular legal services? That issue was addressed in Shaperov. Kentucky
BarAssociation.7
B. Shapero and TargetedSolicitation
Richard Shapero asked Kentucky's Attorney Advertising, Commission to
approve a letter that he wished to send to potential clients. He thought that the
potential clients needed representation in residential foreclosure actions. Although
there was nothing false or misleading about Shapero's letter, the commission
rejected the letter because a Kentucky rule prohibited attorneys from sending
written advertisements "precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or
2
relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public."
Shapero also asked the Kentucky Bar Association's Committee (n Legal Ethics for
an opinion on the validity ofthe rule itself. The Committee, in an opinion that was
formally adopted by the Bar Association's Board of Goveniors, did not find
Shapero's proposed letter to be false ormisleading, but it upheld the Kentucky rule
that prohibited such solicitations on the ground that the rule was consistent with the
American Bar Association's model rule on solicitation.29 On review, the
Kentucky Supreme Court deleted the existing Kentucky rule ort solicitation,"0 but

26. Id. at 468, 98 S. Ct. at 1925. Cf In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, S'8 S. Ct. 1893 (1978)
(ACLU attorney engaged in solicitation of a prospective client, not for pecuniary reasons, but to
identify a plaintiff who could challenge a practice of sterilizing pregnant mothecrs who were receiving
public assistance. The Supreme Court indicated that this type of solicitation came within the right
to engage in political expression and political association, and that a prophylactic rule was therefore
unconstitutional. The attorney could not be disciplined, said the Court, "unless her activity in fact
involved the type of misconduct leg. fraud or duress] at which [the State's] broad prohibition is said
to be directed.').
27. 486 U.S. 466, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
28. See 486 U.S. at 469-70, 108 S. Ct. at 1919-20. However, the Commission also noted its

view that the Kentucky rule violated the First Amendment, and it recommended that the Kentucky
Supreme Court amend its rules. Id. at 470, 108 S.Ct. at 1920.
29. Id. at 470, 108 S.Ct. at 1920.
30. The Kentucky court did not identify the "precise infirmity" in the e:isting Rule, but it said
that it felt "compelled by the decision in Zauderer" to order that the old rule be deleted. See id. In
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265 (1985), the United States
Supreme Court ruled that First Amendment protections applied to "targeted" newspaper advertise.
ments. The advertisement in that case invited Dalkon shield claimants to contact the attorney about
potential personal injury claims.
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it adopted ABA Model Rule 7.3, which prohibited targeted, direct-mail solicitation
by lawyers for pecuniary gain."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a
blanket prohibition against targeted mailings was consistent with the provisions
of the First Amendment. The Court ruled that it was not. The Court thought
that Shapero's letter was more akin to advertising, which was entitled to
substantial First Amendment protection, than to in-person solicitation, which was
not:

Like print advertising, petitioner's letter-and targeted, direct mail
solicitation generally-"poses much less risk of over-reaching or undue
influence" than does in-person solicitation ....

Neither mode of written

communication involves "the coercive force of the personal presence of
a trained advocate" or the "pressure on the potential client for an
immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.". . A letter,
like a printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can readily be put in
a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded.32
The Court acknowledged that targeted direct-mail solicitation presented
"lawyers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes," but that was not
enough to "justify a total ban on that mode of protected speech." 33 Instead, the
State could "regulate such abuses and minimize mistakes through far less
restrictive and more precise means."3
C. Went For It and a Thirty-Day Waiting Period
Targeted solicitation issues came before the Court again in the 1995 case of
FloridaBarv. Went ForIt, Inc.3s This time, the issue was the constitutionality
of a Florida rule that prohibited attorneys from making direct mail solicitations
to victims of accidents, or relatives of those victims, within thirty days of the
occurrence of an accident or disaster. The Court upheld the constitutionality of

31. 486 U.S. at 470, 108 S. Ct. at 1920. ABA Model Rule 7.3 stated:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom
the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person or
otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary
gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter

or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not

include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not
known to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter.
but who ae so situated that they might in general find such services useful.
Id. at 470-71, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
32. Id. at 475-76, 108 S. Ct. at 1923 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 476, 108 S. Ct. at 1923.
34. Id.
35.

115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
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the rule. Because the Went For It decision dealt with a solicitation rule that is
very similar to the new Louisiana rule, the case merits some discussion here.
1. The FloridaRule and the Background of the Litigation
In 1989, the Florida Bar completed a two-year study on the effects of lawyer
advertising on public opinion. Based on the study, the bar concluded that some
changes in the rules for lawyer advertising should be made. The Florida
Supreme Court agreed and it adopted some amendments in late 1990. One of
the amendments imposed a thirty-day waiting period:
A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, ....
a written
communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
professional employment if: (A)the written communication :oncerns an
action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an
accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is
addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster36
occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication.
Florida lawyers were also prohibited from accepting client referrals from a lawyer
referral service that engages in direct contact with prospective clients "in a manner
that would violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct if the communication or
37
contact were made by the lawyer.
An individual, McHenry, and his wholly-owned lawyer referral service, Went
For It,Inc., filed an action challenging the Florida rules as violative ofthe First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. McHenry routinely sent targeted
solicitations to accident victims or their survivors within thirty days of the
accidents, and he wanted to continue this practice in the future. The Federal
District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, 38 and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed.39
2. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor noted that the case involved
commercial speech, and that the Court would consider restrictions on such speech
using an "intermediate" level of scrutiny:
Nearly two decades of cases have built upon the foundation laid by
Bates. It is now well established that lawyer advertising is commercial
speech and, as such, is accorded a measure of First Amendment protec-

36. Fla. Stat. Ann. Bar Rule 4.7.4(b)(1) (Supp. 1996).
37. Fla. Stat. Ann. Bar Rule 4-7.8(a) (West 1994).
38. McHenry was disbarred for reasons unrelated to the litigation. Blakcly, another Florida
lawyer, was substituted as a plaintiff. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2371.
39. 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994).
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tion .... Such First Amendment protection, of course, is not absolute.
We have always been careful to distinguish commercial speech from
speech at the First Amendment's core ....
Mindful of these concerns, we engage in "intermediate" scrutiny of
restrictions on commercial speech, analyzing them under the framework
set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm 'n offN.Y ... Under CentralHudson, the government may freely
regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is
misleading .... Commercial speech that falls into neither of those
categories, like the advertising at issue here, may be regulated if the
government satisfies a test consisting of three related prongs: first, the
government must assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation;
second, the government must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances that interest; and third, the
regulation must be "'narrowly drawn."'
The Court then went on to apply the CentralHudson test. With respect to the
first prong of the test, that there be a "substantial interest in support of the
regulation," the Florida Bar had referred to the privacy of personal injury victims
and to the reputation of the legal profession. The Court noted:
The Florida Bar asserts that it has a substantial interest in protecting the
privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved ones
against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers .... This interest
obviously factors into the Bar's paramount (and repeatedly professed)
objective ofcurbing activities that "negatively affec[t] the administration
ofjustice."... Because direct mail solicitations in the wake of accidents
are perceived by the public as intrusive, the Bar argues, the reputation of
the legal profession in the eyes ofFloridians has suffered commensurately .... The regulation, then is an effort to protect the flagging reputations
ofFlorida lawyers by preventing them from engaging in conduct that, the
Bar maintains, "'is universally regarded as deplorable and beneath
common decency because of its intrusion upon4 the special vulnerability
and private grief of victims or their families.' '
The Court had "little trouble" concluding that this interest was substantial. 2
The second prong ofthe CentralHudson test requires the state to demonstrate
that the regulation advances the state's interest "in a direct and material way."' 3
This burden, said the Court "'is not satisfied by mere speculation and conjecture;
rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech

40.
41.
42.
43.

115 S. Ct. at 2375-76.
Id at 2376.
Id.
Id. at 2377.
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must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree."'" In this case, the Court concluded that the
State had met its burden on the strength of its two-year study. A 106 page
summary of the study that had been presented to the District Court contained
"data-both statistical and anecdotal-supporting the Bar's contentions that the
Florida public views direct-mail solicitations in the immediate wake of accidents
as an intrusion on privacy that reflects poorly upon the profession."' ,
In discussing the second prong ofthe CentralHudson test, the: Supreme Court
also distinguished its earlier decision in the Shaperocase. In the first place, it said
that the State, in Shapero, "did not seek to justify its regulation as a measure
undertaken to prevent lawyers' invasions ofprivacy interests .... Rather, the State
focused exclusively on the special dangers of overreaching inhering in targeted
solicitations." A second distinction was that Shapero"dealt with a broad ban on
all direct-mail solicitations '7 not a thirty-day waiting period on mailed solicitations to accident victims. Finally, the Court noted that the State in Shaperohad
"assembled no evidence attempting to demonstrate any actual harm caused by
targeted direct mail."' 8 In contrast, the State in Went ForIt had submitted the
results of a two-year study.
The third prong of the CentralHudson test requires the State's restriction to
be narrowly drawn. This is not, said the Court, a requirement that the State use the
"least restrictive means" available, nor is it equivalent to a "ratio~nal basis" test."
Instead, it is a requirement that the fit be "reasonable"-that it represent a
disposition whose scope is "in proportion to the interest served."" The Court was
not convinced by arguments that the Florida rule was unconstitutionally overinclu44. Id. (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., i 15 S. Ct. 1585, 1588 (1995), and Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761. 770-71, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993)).
45. 115 S. Ct. at 2377. The summary reported that, as of June 1989, Florida lawyers were
mailing 700,000 direct solicitations annually. It recited survey results showing -that Floridians have
"negative feelings" about attorneys who engage in direct mail advertising. And it included an
"anecdotal record ... noteworthy for its breadth and detail" showing public dissatisfaction with
lawyers who send targeted direct mail solicitations to accident victims. Id.
The dissenting Justices were not as impressed with the study, pointing out, for example, that the
Court had few indications of the sample size or selection procedures used in the public opinion
surveys, and that the Court had not been provided with actual copies of the surveys.
The majority repeated that the Bar's evidence was sufficient, and then went on to say:
In any event, we do not read our case law to require that empirical data come to us
accompanied by a surfeit of background information. Indeed, in other Fir:t Amendment
contexts, we have permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies
and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether... or even, in a case applying
strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and "simple
common sense."

Id. at 2378.
46. Id.
47.

Id.

48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 2380.
Id. (quoting from Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
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sive because it "bans targeted mailings even to citizens whose injuries or grief are
relatively minor," and that it prevents citizens from learning about their legal
options at a time when other actors, such as claims adjustors, may be "clamoring
for victims' attentions." 2 In light ofthe relatively brief period of the ban, and the
difficulty ofdistinguishing "among injured Floridians by the severity oftheir pain
or the intensity of their grief,"53 the Court concluded that the "Bar's rule is
reasonably well-tailored to its stated objective of eliminating targeted mailings
whose type and timing are a source ofdistress to Floridians, distress that has caused
many of them to lose respect for the legal profession." Because the Florida
statute satisfied all three prongs of the CentralHudson test, the Court concluded
that it was constitutional."5
3. The Dissent
Justice Kennedy wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by three other
justices. He agreed that the CentralHudson test was controlling, but concluded
that the Florida rule did not satisfy its elements.
As an initial matter, Justice Kennedy did not believe that the interests that had
been advanced in support of the rule" were substantial enough to sustain the
restriction on speech. With respect to the claimed interest in preserving the privacy
of accident victims, he said that the "problem the Court confronts, and cannot
overcome""8 is its own decision in Shapero. In that case, the Court had recognized a distinction between direct in-person solicitation and direct mail solicitation
and had concluded that "the mode of communication makes all the difference.""9
Justice Kennedy said that the danger perceived by the Shapero Court was not
"whether there exist potential clients whose 'condition' makes them susceptible to

51.
52.

Id.
Id.

53.

Id.

54. Id. The Court also observed that the 30-day rule did not prevent citizens from learning
about their legal options, because there were "many other ways for injured Floridians to learn about
the availability of legal representation during that time." Id.
55. In so concluding, the Court stated:
The Bar has substantial interest both in protecting injured Floridians from invasive
conduct by lawyers and in preventing the erosion ofconfidence in the profession that such
repeated invasions have engendered. The Bar's proffered study, unrebutted by
respondents below, provides evidence indicating that the harms it targets are far from

illusory. The palliative devised by the Bar to address these harms is narrow both in scope
and in duration. The Constitution, in our view, requires nothing more.
Id. at 2381.
56. The other dissenters were Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.
57.

Those interests were: (I) preserving the tranquility of accident victims and their families,

and (2) protecting the reputation and dignity of the legal profession. Id. at 2382-83.
58. Id. at 2382.
59. Id. (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 475, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1922

(1988)).

1997]

N. GREGORY SMITH

undue influence, but whether the mode of communication pose:; a serious danger
that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility." In contrast, the Went ForIt
majority was concerned "that victims or their families will be offended by receiving
a solicitation during their grief and trauma."6' Justice Kennedy disagreed with
this focus of concern, stating that, "we do not allow restrictions on speech to be
justified on the ground the expression might offend the listener." 2
Nor was Justice Kennedy persuaded that the rule could be justified by the
proffered interest in preserving the reputation and dignity ofthe: legal profession.
While he acknowledged that "disrespect will arise from an unethical and improper
practice," 3 he said that "the majority begs a most critical question by assuming
that direct mail solicitations constitute such a practice."" On the contrary, he said
that direct solicitation "may serve vital purposes and promote the administration of
justice .... The disrespect argument... proceeds from the very assumption it tries
to prove, which is to say that solicitations within 30 days serve no legitimate
purpose."'s
Justice Kennedy also concluded that the Florida rule flunked the second prong
of the CentralHudson test. "(W]hat the State has offered," he said, "falls well
short of demonstrating that the harms it is trying to redress are real, let alone that
the regulation directly and materially advances the State's interests."" The State
did submit a "Summary of Record" in support ofits position. However, the dissent
noted:
This document includes no actual surveys, few indications of sample size
or selection procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no
discussion of excluded results. There is no description of the statistical
universe or scientific framework that permits any productive use of the
information the so-called Summary of Record contains. The majority
describes this anecdotal matter as "noteworthy for its breadth and detail,"
...but when examined, it is: noteworthy for its incompetence.... Our
cases require something more than a few pages of self-serving and
unsupported statements by the State to demonstrate that a regulation
directly and materially advances the elimination ofa real harm when the
State seeks to suppress truthful and nondeceptive speech."7
60.

Id. (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 474, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1922

(1988)).
61. Id. at 2382-83.
62. Id. at 2383. In support of this contention, Justice Kennedy cited Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2280 (1985), wher: the Court had struck
down a ban on attorney advertising and had said that "the mere possibility that some members of the
population might find advertising... offensive cannot justify suppressing it."
63. Id. at 2383.

64.

Id.

65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 2384.
Id. More specifically, Justice Kennedy said:
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Finally, as to the third prong of the test, Justice Kennedy concluded that "the
relationship between the Bar's interests and the means chosen to serve them is
not a reasonable fit."'" He thought that the Florida rule created a "flat ban that
prohibits far more speech than necessary to serve the purported state interest."69
The ban applied to "all accidental injuries, whatever their gravity." 70 "With
regard to lesser injuries," he said, "there is little chance that for any period, much
less 30 days, the victims will become distraught upon hearing from an
attorney."'" And "as to more serious injuries, the State's argument fails, since
it must be conceded that prompt legal representation is essential where death or
injury results from accidents."" The effect of the rule, thought Justice
Kennedy, would
fall on those who most need legal representation: for those with minor
injuries, the victims too ill-informed to know an attorney may be
interested in their cases; for those with serious injuries, the victims too
ill-informed to know that time is of the essence if counsel is to
assemble evidence and warn them not to enter into settlement negotiations or evidentiary discussions with investigators for opposing
parties."
4. Responses to the Decision
Went For It was a five-to-four decision in which, for the first time since
Bates, the United States Supreme Court had upheld a state restriction on lawyer
"advertising." The case has generated a considerable volume of commentary,

The selective synopses of unvalidated studies deal, for the most part, with television
advertising and phone book listings, and not direct mail solicitations. Although there may
be issues common to various kinds of attorney advertising and solicitation, it is not clear
what would follow from that limited premise, unless the Court means by its decision to
call into question all forms of attorney advertising. The most generous reading of this
document permits identification of 34 pages on which direct mail solicitation is arguably
discussed. Of these, only two are even a synopsis of a study of the attitudes of Floridians
toward such solicitations....
It is telling that the essential thrust of all the material adduced to justify the State's
interest is devoted to the reputational concerns of the Bar. It is not at all clear that this
regulation advances the interest of protecting persons who are suffering trauma and grief,
and we are cited to no material in the record for that claim .... Having declared that the
privacy interest is one both substantial and served by the regulation, the Court ought not
to be excused from justifying its conclusion.
Id.

68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.

71.

Id. at 2285.

72.
73.

Id.
Id.

Id.
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much of it unfavorable 4 Critics have frequently echoed the views of Justice
Kennedy about the Court's cutting back on First Amendment protections." Bar
associations and state supreme courts have tended to have another reaction.
After the case came down, several states, Louisiana included, adopted Floridalike waiting period rules.7
Although the majority opinion in Went ForIt may certainly be subject to
reasonable criticism, this article is more concerned with the application of the
Went ForIt decision than it is with deficiencies, or perceived deficiencies, in the
opinion itself. The next section of this article considers the constitutionality of
the Louisiana waiting period rule, in light of the Went ForIt decision and other
relevant authorities.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LOUISIANA RULE
A. The Federal Constitution
1. Is There a Potential Problem?
Louisiana's thirty day waiting period rule is very similar to the one approved
by the Supreme Court in Went ForIt. At first glance, the constitutionality of the
Louisiana rule might appear to be a given, but there is at least one issue that

74. See, e.g., Robert Battey, Loosening the Glue: Lawyer Advertising, Solicitation and
Commercialism, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 287, 302-06 (1995); Israel Dahan, Attorney Direct-Mail
Solicitation Revisited in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: A Step Too Far,4 J.L. & Pol'y 611, 647
(1996); Tara L. Lattomns, Offensiveness, The New Standard For First Amendment Legal Advertising
Cases: Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1209, 1251-55 (1995); Marc David Lawlor,
Ivory Tower Paternalism and Lawyer Advertising: The Case ofFlorida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 40
St. Louis U. L.J. 895, 921 (1996); Todd Mitchell, Privacy and Popularity: The Supreme Court
Attempts to Polish the Public Image of the Legal Profession in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 74
N.C. L. Rev. 1681, 1715 (1996); Kim Y. Oldham, "Let Me Represent You!" Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc.: Supreme Court Succumbs to State Regulation of Lawyer Adve.-tising, 4 Comm. L.
Conspectus 83, 91 (1996); Daniel L. Zelenko, Do You Need ALawyer? You May Have to Wait 30
Days: The Supreme Court Went Too Far in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 45 Am. U.L. Rev. 1215,
1237 (1996); Commercial Speech-Attorney Advertising, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 190, 198-99 (1995).
75. See, e.g., supra note 74.
76. See Ala. Code, Rules of Alabama Supreme Court, A.R.P.C. Rule 7.3(b)(1)(i) (1996); Tenn.
Code Ann., Court Rules, Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 8, DR-2-104(c) (1996). In January, 1996,
the President of the Rhode Island Bar stated that "many states are now actively considering such a
rule following the Went For It, Inc. decision." R. Kelly Sheridan, President's Message, 44 R.I. B.J.
3, 4 (1996).
Since 1992, Texas has had a penal statute that prohibits direct mail solicitation within 30 days of
an accident. The statute isnot limited to attorneys. It also covers solicitation letters by chiropractors,
physicians, surgeons, private investigators, and licensed health care providers. See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 38.12(bXl) (West 1992). In 1995, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
a claim by attorneys that the statute's 30-day waiting period for lawyer solicitation letters violated

the federal Constitution. See Moore v. Morales, 63 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 917 (1996).
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merits discussion. The second prong of the Central Hudson test-the one
requiring the state to show that its restriction directly and materially advances a

substantial interest-was satisfied in Went For It because Florida had done a
two-year study that generated empirical and anecdotal information supportive of
the rule. Although Louisiana could presumably rely on the same "substantial"
interests that were articulated by the Florida Bar in Went ForIt, it does not seem
that Louisiana undertook a study equivalent to the one that supported the Florida
rule.
The Advertising Committee of the Louisiana Bar Association apparently
gave some consideration to a waiting period rule on targeted solicitation prior to
the issuance of the Went For It decision."

During the 1991-1993 period, the

Committee undertook a rather extensive review of lawyer advertising and
solicitation rules. "' The review included study of regulatory efforts in other
states, consideration of complaints that had been filed with the bar about lawyer
advertising, reviewing decisions of the United States Supreme Court, holding

public hearings, and receiving written comments from lawyers and members of
the public. 79 Some of the information gathered by the Committee apparently
included complaints about solicitation letters to accident victims."

The

77. Telephone interview with E. Phelps Gay (Sept. 24, 1996). Mr. Gay was a member of the
Advertising Committee prior to the issuance of the Went For It decision. He was the chairman of
the committee when Went For Is was handed down. See also Milford Fryer, New Restriction On
Lawyers Was Needed Step, Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, March 10, 1996, at 7B.
78. The Lawyer Advertising Committee of the Louisiana Bar Association was established in
the summer of 1991, with the charge to review the then-existing rules and to determine whether any
action should be taken with respect to them. In 1992, it proposed a working draft of proposed
revisions, and established October 30, 1992 as deadline for submitting comments. See Lawyer
Advertising Rules, Proposed Revisionsfor Consideration, 40 La. B.J. 46 (1992). In June, 1993, the
Committee made its final proposals to the Louisiana State Bar House of Delegates. The House of
Delegates and the Board of Governors approved the rule changes and submitted them to the
Louisiana Supreme Court for approval. The Supreme Court approved the changes on October 1,
1993. See Lawyer Advertising Rules Changes Approved, 41 La. B.J. 345 (1993).
79. See Lawyer AdvertisingRules, Proposed Revisionsfor Consideration, 40 La. B.J. 46-47
(1992).
80. In a report dated May 3, 1993, the Advertising Committee referred to the public hearings
it had conducted and to the comments it had received, and it stated: "There were also a number of
complaints made by individuals who had been the subject of targeted solicitation practices by lawyers
in Louisiana." Report ofthe Lawyer Advertising Committee of the Louisiana State Bar Association,
May 3, 1993, at 9 (on file with Louisiana Law Review).
When the Advertising Committee later proposed a 30-day waiting period rule for targeted
solicitation of accident victims, it mentioned, in a comment to the proposed rule, that it had received
"numerous complaints" about solicitation letters during its 1991-1993 "deliberations":
During its deliberations the Committee heard numerous complaints regarding mail
solicitation of accident victims shortly after the occurrence of an accident. This practice
is considered by many to be offensive and intrusive from the standpoint of the solicited
person and to reflect negatively upon the legal profession. Complaints relating to written
solicitation of accident victims have been received by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
Comment Re Proposed Amendment to Rule 7.2(b)(iii) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
comment also referred to targeted mailings that had been generated in connection with the October
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Advertising Committee was aware, during this period of review, that Florida had
adopted a waiting period rule, and the Committee actually gave some initial
thought to the development of a similar rule for Louisiana."' But the Committee was also aware that the Florida rule had been challenged on constitutional
grounds, and it decided to await judicial developments with respect to that
rule.Y Nonetheless, as a result of its review process, the Committee recommended substantial changes to the rules on advertising and solicitation, and on
October 1, 1993, the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered a number of changes to
be made.'
After the Went For It decision came down, the President of the State Bar
asked the Advertising Committee to make a recommendation on a waiting period
rule." With the Went For It decision before it, the Adverti:ing Committee
proposed a new waiting period rule that was very close to the Florida rule
approved by the Supreme Court.83 In January, 1996, the proposed rule was
unanimously approved by the House of Delegates and the Board of Governors

1995 Bogalusa gas leak: "[lt is a matter of record that numerous solicitation letters were circulated
to Bogalusa residents after the gas leak at the Gaylord Chemical plant this past 0-tober. Expressions
of outrage from the public and many in the legal profession were widely reported." Id.
81. Telephone interview with E. Phelps Gay (September 24, 1996). See also Milford Fryer,
New Restriction on Lawyers was Needed Step, Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, March 10, 1996, at

7B, Barbara Schlictman, New Ethics Rule Aimed at Overly Eager Attorneys, Baton Rouge Advocate,
March 6, 1996, at lB.
82. Telephone interview with Jay C. Zainey (Sept. 23, 1996). Mr. Zainey was the President
of the Louisiana Bar Association at the time the Wentfor It decision was handed down. See also
Milford Fryer, New Restriction on Lawyers Was Needed Step, Baton Rouge Sunctiy Advocate, March
10, 1996, at 7B; Barbara Schlichtman, New Ethics Rule Aimed At Overly Eager Attorneys, Baton

Rouge Advocate, March 6, 1996, at lB (reports that the bar association had been considering a
waiting period rule prior to the October 1995 Bogalusa gas leak, but had questioned the constitutionality of such a rule. The gas leak occurred between the time of the Went For It decision and the
promulgation of the new rule); Comment Re Proposed Amendment to Rule 7.2(b)(iii) of the Rules
of Professional Conduct (States that the Advertising Committee was aware of the Florida rule,
however, "(i]n view of existing jurisprudence, particularly Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn ...
,the
Committee questioned whether the Florida rule would pass constitutional muster").
83.

84.
85.

See Lawyer Advertising Rules Changes Approved, 41 La. B.J. 345 (1993).

Telephone interview with Jay C. Zainey (Sept. 23, 1996).
The initial paragraph of the resolution submitted by the Advertising Committee stated:
WHEREAS, on June 21, 1995 the U.S. Supreme Court in Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., _
U.S. ____, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (1995) upheld the constitutionality of the Florida
law banning targeted mail solicitation of accident victims within thirr, days of the
accident or disaster...
Resolution to Amend Rules of Professional Conduct 7.2(b)(iii). A comment to the proposed rule
said:
At its meeting on December 14, 1995 the Lawyer Advertising Committee decided to
recommend for consideration by the House of Delegates an amendment to current Rule
7.2(b). The proposed rule is essentially identical to the Florida thirty-day ban upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court.
Comment Re Proposed Amendment to Rule 7.2(bXiii) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
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of the State Bar." The Supreme Court adopted the rule on February 19,
1996.8?
It seems that the Louisiana State Bar did not "commission surveys" similar
to the surveys that the Florida Bar utilized to support its waiting period rule
before the United States Supreme Court." The Florida Surveys appear to have
been a source of "statistical" information that was presented to the Court." If
Louisiana did not undertake corresponding surveys, the Louisiana State Bar

86. See Jay C. Zainey, President's Message, 43 La. B.J. 541 (1996). Mr. Zainey indicated in
his message that the amendment was undertaken to improve the image of the profession, particularly
in the aftermath of "outrageous conduct" by client-seeking lawyers following a poisonous gas leak
in Bogalusa, Louisiana:
There is an old saying that goes: There is always good that comes out of bad. We saw
the worst of our profession following the poisonous gas leak in Bogalusa. Although this
outrageous conduct took place in a small town in southeast Louisiana, the effects were felt
by lawyers statewide.
The Louisiana State Bar Association stepped in and did something about it. In their first
meeting since the Bogalusa incident, and the first meeting since the constitutional issue
was decided by the United States Supreme Court. your representatives on the House of
Delegates ... UNANIMOUSLY voted to, in effect, prohibit lawyers from sending mail
solicitation letters to accident victims for a period of 30 days from the date of the
accident.
...
I feel we have taken a giant leap forward in restoring dignity to our profession ....
Id. The Bogalusa gas leak in October of 1995 "sent more than 4000 residents to emergency rooms
and displaced thousands from their homes for three days." Barbara Schlichtman, New Ethics Rule
Aimed At Overly Eager Attorneys, Baton Rouge Advocate, March 6, 1996, at lB.
87. Rule 7.2.
88. Telephone interview with E. Phelps Gay (Sept. 24, 1996). The majority opinion in Went
ForIt stated: "After conducting hearings, commissioning surveys, and reviewing extensive public
commentary, the Bar determined that several changes to its advertising rules were in order." Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2374 (1995). The summary of the Florida study that was
presented to the Supreme Court contained "data-statistical and anecdotal-supporting the Bar's
contentions that the Florida public views direct mail solicitations in the immediate wake of accidents
as an intrusion on privacy that reflects poorly upon the profession." Id. at 2377.
89. According to the majority opinion in Went for It:
As of June 1989, lawyers mailed 700,000 direct solicitations in Florida annually. 40% of
which were aimed at accident victims or their survivors ....
Fifty-four percent of the
general population surveyed said that contacting persons concerning accidents or similar
events is a violation of privacy .... A random sampling of persons who received directmail advertising from lawyers in 1987 revealed that 45% believed that direct-mail
solicitation is "designed to take advantage of gullible or unstable people"; 34% found such
tactics "annoying or irritating"; 26% found it "an invasion of your privacy"; and 24%
reported that it "made you angry."... Significantly, 27% of direct-mail recipients
reported that their regard for the legal profession and for the judicial process as a whole
was "lower" as a result of receiving the direct mail.

Id. at 2377. It is not clear whether this is all of the statistical information that was contained in the
106 page summary submitted by the Florida Bar. Whether or not there was other such data, the data
that is referenced above provides some indication of the extent to which targeted mailings was a
problem in Florida.
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would probably be unable to generate corresponding statistical data. To what
extent is this a problem?
2. Help From Dicta?
Dicta in Went For It suggests that Louisiana's lack of statistical data may
not be much of a problem. The majority opinion stated:
[We believe the evidence adduced by the Bar is sufficient to meet the
standard elaborated in Edenfield, supra. In any event, we do not read
our case law to require that empirical data come to us accompanied by
a surfeit of background information. Indeed, in other First Amendment
contexts, we have permitted litigants to justify speech res;trictions by
reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales
altogether, ... or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify
restrictions
based solely on history, consensus, and "simple common
' °
sense. "
This language suggests the possibility that Louisiana might be able to use the
Florida summary as a basis for its changes to Rule 7.2. The siunmary contains
"studies and anecdotes" from a different "locale." And the Went ForIt decision
pronounced the Florida evidence sufficient to justify a thirty-day waiting period
rule. If people in Florida believe that targeted mailings within thirty days of an
accident are "intrusive," and if they think less well of lawyers because of such
solicitations, it is likely that people in Louisiana would believe and think
similarly. In any event, it could be contended that "simple common sense"
indicates that seriously injured individuals, or their survivors, are likely to take
offense, and are likely to think poorly of lawyers, if they are inundated with
solicitation letters at a time of post-accident grief.
The problem, of course, with all of this is that the language quoted above
is simply dicta; the Court in Went ForIt based its decision on the second prong
of the CentralHudson test on the existence of a Florida study that produced both
statistical and anecdotal information in support of the rule. A subordinate
problem is with the language of the dicta itself. The majofity opinion cites
several cases to support the statements in the dicta, but, at least in some respects,
the language of the dicta seems broader than is warranted by the cited cases.
The Went For It majority cites Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.91 and
Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,Inc.9" to support
the idea that "studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales" may be used

90. Id. at 2378 (italics added) (referring to Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71, 113 S.Ct.
1792, 1800 (1993)).
91. 475 U.S. 41. 106 S. Ct. 925, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132, 106 S.Ct. 1663 (1986).
92. 501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456 (1991).
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to justify restrictions on free speech. 3 The Renton opinion provides good
support for the idea of relying on the "experience of' and "studies produced
by"' other locales. However, neither Renton, nor the concurring opinion in
Barnes, provide clear support for the idea of relying on mere "anecdotes" to
support free speech restrictions, unless one takes the view, not altogether
unreasonable, that experiences, studies, and perhaps even some court deci-

sions,9" are compilations of anecdotes.
The Went For It opinion also referred to Burson v. Freeman' for the
proposition that "history, consensus and 'simple common sense"' may be enough
to justify free speech restrictions. 7 This case featured a rare conflict between
the right of free speech and the right to vote. The dispute was over a Tennessee
statute that prohibited solicitation of votes within 100 feet of the entrance to a
polling place. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the plurality opinion stated:
Here, the State, as recognized administrator of elections, has asserted
that the exercise of free speech rights conflicts with another fundamental right, the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of
intimidation and fraud. A long history, a substantial consensus, and
simple common sense show that some restricted zone around polling
places is necessary to protect that fundamental right. Given the conflict
between these two rights, we hold that requiring solicitors to stand 100
feet from the entrances to 9polling places does not constitute an
unconstitutional compromise.
Earlier, Justice Blackmun wrote: "[B]ecause a government has such a
compelling interest in securing the right to vote freely and effectively, this Court
never has held a State 'to the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective
effects on political stability that [are] produced' by the voting regulation in
question."'" He indicated that a lesser burden of proof was appropriate in a
case where "the First Amendment right threatens to interfere with the. act of
voting itself."'" Given the rather unusual conflict between rights involved in
the Burson case, the fact that the language quoted by Justice O'Connor comes
from a plurality opinion, and the reasoning of the opinion itself, it is not clear

93. Went ForIt,
115 S. Ct. at 2378.
94. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 930.
95. The Court in Renton said that the Renton City Council was entitled to rely on detailed
findings summarized in a reported decision of the Washington Supreme Court. Id. at 51, 106 S.Ct.
at 931.
96..
97.
98.
99.
195, 107
100.

504 U.S. 191, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
Went For it,
115 S. Ct. at 2378.
504 U.S. at 211, 112 S.Ct. at 1857-58.
Id. at 208, 112 S.Ct. at 1856 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189,
S. Ct. 533, 537 (1986)).
504U.S. at209n.ll, 112S. Ct. at1856 n.l.
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that "history, consensus, and simple common sense" (much less common sense
alone) would be enough to justify free speech restrictions in other situations.'*'
3. Help From Renton?

As suggested above, the Renton case is potentially relevant to the current
inquiry. The city ofRenton had enacted an ordinance that prohibited adult movie
theaters from operating in certain areas of the city. The city relied on "the
experience of, and studies produced by, the city of Seattle," to support its
contention that the ordinance was "aimed" not at the content of speech as such, but
at preventing certain "secondary effects," such as urban blight, "caused by the
presence of even one such theater in a given neighborhood."'0' It is not entirely
clear whether the Renton city council had actual Seattle-area studies before it at the
time it enacted the ordinance. 3 But the council apparently did have before it the
opinion of the Washington Supreme Court in NorthendCinema, Inc. v. Seattle," 4

which described Seattle's experience relating to adult movie theaters and which
included trial court testimony on the negative effects adult movie theaters on nearby
neighborhoods. The Supreme Court said:
We hold that Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle
and other cities, and in particular on the "detailed findings" summarized
in the Washington Supreme Court's NorthendCinema opinion in enacting
its adult theater zoning ordinance. The First Amendment does not require
a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or
produce evidence independent ofthat already generated by other cities, so
long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to
be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.'

101. Which may not be a good thing. Common sense does not always seen to receive the credit
it deserves, and may have once enjoyed. We have become a rather empirical people. If a restriction
on expression were to actually enjoy the support of common sense, it would be rather wasteful of
resources to also require that the restriction be supported by empirical evideno:.
102. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50, 106 S. Ct. 925, 930, reh 'g denied, 475
U.S. 1132, 106 S.Ct. 1663 (1986).
103. Justice Brennan, who dissented in the Renton case, said that the city council had "never
actually reviewed any of the studies" that had been conducted by Seattle and Detroit. Id. at 61, 106
S. Ct. at 936.
After the litigation had commenced, the city council amended the Renton ordinance, and added
a statement of reasons for its enactment. Id. at 45, 106 S.Ct. at 927. The citt council added that
it had intended to rely on the opinion of the Washington Supreme Court in Northend Cinema, Inc.
v. Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153 (Wash. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946, 99 S. Ct. 2166 (1979), a case
that had upheld Seattle's zoning regulations against constitutional attack. See Renton, 475 U.S. at
50-51, 51 n.5, 106 S. Ct. at 930, 936 n.5. Justice Brennan complained that "despite the suspicious
coincidental timing of the amendment, the Court holds that 'Renton was entitled to rely... on the
"detailed findings" summarized in the... Northend Cinema opinion."' See Reton, 475 U.S. at 61
n.5, 106 S.Ct. at 936 n.5.
104. 585 P.2d 1153 (Wash. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946, 99 S. Ct. 2166 (1979).
105. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. at 931.
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This case supports not only the propriety of relying on a study from another
locale, but also the propriety of relying on court opinions that contain "findings"
relevant to the subject matter of the study. Therefore, Renton is potentially
relevant with respect to the constitutionality of the Louisiana waiting period rule,
because the Went For It decision, with its references to the Florida study, was
before the Advertising Committee of the State Bar when it proposed the
amendment to Rule 7.2.
4. Edenfield and the Second Prong
On the other hand, at least one pre-Went For It decision suggests that the
state's showing on the second prong of the Central Hudson test should
incorporate a fair degree of rigor. In Edenfleld v. Fane,s° the Supreme Court
stated that the state's burden "is not satisfied by mere speculation and conjecture;
rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."' O7 Read literally, this seems
to be a fairly difficult burden to meet, particularly the demonstration of
prospective success that seems to be required.
Edenfleld itself involved a ban on in-person solicitation by Florida certified

public accountants."ca Although the Supreme Court thought that the State had
articulated significant interests in support of the ban,'" it concluded that the
State Board of Accouhtancy had not met its burden on the second prong of the
CentralHudson test. The Court stated that the Board "presents no studies that
suggest personal solicitation of prospective business clients by CPAs creates the
dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised independence that the board
claims to fear."" 0 Moreover "[t]he record does not disclose any anecdotal

evidence, either from Florida or another State, that validates the Board's
suppositions.""' The Board had actually offered an affidavit and a report on
CPA solicitation prepared by the American Institute of Certified Public

Accountants. The Court, however, found these offerings to be deficient: the
report, which had been prepared in 1981, was found to contradict the Board's

106. 507 U.S. 761, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
107. Id. at 770-71, 113 S. Ct. at 1800.
108. The Florida rule provided that a CPA "shall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited
solicitation solicit an engagement to perform public accounting services... where the engagement
would be for a person or entity not already a client of [the CPA], unless such person or entity has
invited such a communication." See 507 U.S. at 764, 113 S. Ct. at 1796 (quoting Fla. Admin. Code
Ann. r. 21A-24.002(2Xc) (1992)).
109. The Board satisfied the first prong of the analysis by arguing that the state had substantial
interests in protecting consumers from fraud and overreaching and in maintaining the fact and the
appearance of CPA independence in auditing businesses and in attesting to financial statements. Id.
at 768, 113 S. Ct. at 1798.
110. Id. at 771, 113 S. Ct. at 1800.
111. Id.
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assertions, and the affidavit was regarded as "nothing more than a series of
conclusory statements."" The Court held that "as applied to CPA solicitation
in the business context," the Florida rule violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." 3
Edenfleld was, from one perspective, a harder case than Wenut ForIt for the
state to win. The restriction in Went ForIt was limited to a thirty-day period;
the restriction in Edenfleld was unlimited in time. In addition, the report that the
Accountancy Board offered in Edenfield was weaker than the study that the
Florida Bar offered in Went For It. On the other hand, Edenfield involved a
prohibition against direct in-person solicitation, the very type of ban that had
been upheld by the Supreme Court in Ohralik. If it is appropriate to ban direct,
in-person solicitation of clients by attorneys, then it might be thought appropriate
to ban such solicitation by accountants. Still, the ban was rejected in Edenfield.
This result may be partially attributed to the Court's focus on "business"
solicitation by accountants in Edenfield,which has less risk of overreaching, and
is less likely to cause distress, than in-person solicitation of s:eriously-injured
accident victims by attorneys." 4 But the result may also reflect a bit of rigor
in the Edenfield Court's requirements with respect to supporting studies for the
second prong of the CentralHudson test.
5.Louisiana'sRule
Assuming that the information recited earlier about the Louisiana "study" is
accurate,"' it seems reasonable to conclude that Louisiana's study is not as
strong as the study that supported the Florida rule in Went ForIt. On the other
hand, Louisiana would be able to make a stronger showing than the State did in
Edenfleld, where the only study that was presented apparently contradicted the
State's position. Louisiana would also enjoy one advantage that Florida did not
have in Went ForIt: a previous opinion by the United States; Supreme Court
upholding a thirty-day waiting period rule and containing "statistical and
anecdotal" information from a study supporting such a rule. The majority
opinion in Wentfor It indicated, in dicta, that the State might be able to justify

112. Id.
113. In dissent, Justice O'Connor said that by attempting to limit its holding to the rule's
application in the business context, the Court had implied that the rule itself satisfied the Central
Hudson test. Her view was that the rule did satisfy the Central Hudson test, and that the Court's
opinion was inconsistent with Ohralik v.Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912 (1978),
a case in which the Supreme Court had upheld a ban against in-person solicitation by attorneys. 507
U.S. at 779, 113 S.Ct. at 1809.
114. Of course, this line ofthought would also support First Amendment protection for attorneys
who are engaged in in-person solicitation of "business" clients. Cf Justice Marshall's discussion of
"benign" solicitation in his concurring opinion in the Ohralikcase. 436 U.S. ai; 472 & n.3, 98 S.Ct.
at 1927 & n.3.
115. That is, that the 1991-1993 review by the Advertising Committve generated at least
"anecdotal data" supportive of a 30-day waiting period.
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speech restrictions "by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different
locales altogether." The Renton case shows an instance of reliance on a court
opinion that contained findings based on a study in another locale. The Went
ForIt decision itself sets forth a considerable amount of statistical and anecdotal
information supportive of the Florida rule. It seems that the Supreme Court
majority has invited reliance on that information.
If Louisiana were to lose a constitutional contest over the second prong of
the Central Hudson test, it would probably be because Louisiana did not
undertake formal surveys from which statistical information could be generated.
It might be contended that the absence of such statistical data makes it
impossible to determine the extent to which targeted mailing to accident victims
really was a problem in Louisiana prior to the amendment to Rule 7.2. But if
this were to be determinative of the constitutional issue, it would mean, as a
practical matter, that no state could impose a thirty-day waiting period without
doing predicate survey work. Presumably, the results of the survey would then
have to show that there was an appreciable level of targeted mailing activity by
lawyers and that a statistically significant number of recipients of targeted
mailings found the mailings to be "intrusive."
Given the importance of free speech, even commercial speech, some might
argue that survey information of this sort would be an appropriate thing to
require. But a universal requirement of this nature should not be imposed simply
to make it more expensive for a state to adopt a thirty-day waiting period. Once
at -least one state has gathered sufficient survey data to support a ban, a
requirement that another state also conduct surveys should be based on doubts
about whether the results of the existing surveys carry over to the new state that
is considering a ban. It is perhaps theoretically possible that accident victims in
a new state would be generally pleased to receive solicitation letters that would
generally offend residents of another state where survey data had been gathered.
This does not seem very likely, however, if the new state has collected
"anecdotal" information showing that its residents regard such solicitations as
"intrusive."
Translated into the context of the Renton case, the argument might have
been that a local study should be required of the effects of adult movie theaters
on neighborhoods in the City of Renton, because an adult movie theater that
would cause blight in residential neighborhoods of Seattle, or some other city,
might not do so (or might even improve conditions) in comparable residential
neighborhoods of Renton. Of course, the Supreme Court required no such local
study in the Renton case. It was enough that the "evidence the city relies upon
is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.""' 6
That evidence consisted, in large part, of findings related to a Seattle-area study
that were contained in a court decision.

116.

Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 47.5 U.S. 41, 51-52, 106 S. Ct. 925, 931 (1986).

1997)

N. GREGORY SMITH

Although the question is not free from doubt, it appears that the new

Louisiana rule may have sufficient support to survive the second prong of the
Central Hudson test. The Louisiana State Bar Advertising Committee had the
Went For It decision before it when it proposed thirty-day waiting period rule,
and it took that opinion into account. That opinion, in turn, refirenced Florida
survey information on the negative effects of solicitation letters to accident
victims. Finally, the Advertising Committee had apparently already gathered
anecdotal information on the negative effects of solicitation letters to accident
victims. This may be enough." 7

B. The Louisiana Constitution
1. Free Speech: More or Less Protected in Louisiana?

A restriction on speech might pass muster under the federal Constitution and
still run afoul of state constitutional requirements"' because the language, or

117. Even if it were not enough, there might be another way to support he new rule. The
state's burden, under the second prong of the Central Hudson test, is not to show what the state's
motive was at the time it adopted the restriction on speech. Instead, the burden is to "demonstrate
that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances" a !ubstantial interest.
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.Ct..at 2376. As a practical matter, the time when that burden
must be met is the time when the rule is challenged in court.
A recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision indicates one way in which that burden might be
satisfied. In Moore v. Morales, 63 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 917 (1996), a
post-Went For It decision, the Fifth Circuit upheld a Texas penal statute that imposed a 30-day
waiting period on lawyer solicitation letters. There is no indication, in the reported opinion, that
"studies" were conducted before the adoption of the waiting period. The evidence that the cou
considered in support of the limitation appears to have consisted mostly of teitimony offered by
witnesses at a bench trial in federal district court:
Before us is extensive evidence ofthe great number ofcomplaints associated with direct
mail solicitation in general. As to such solicitation within 30-days of an accident, experts
for the State testified that it can be detrimental to an accident victim and his or her family.
They testified further that the 30-day ban would provide reasonable protectin from many
of these detrimental effects.
There is also testimony from individuals that their receipt of direct mnil solicitation
immediately following an accident outraged them, invaded their privacy, and contributed
to their emotional distress. Those same individuals testified that they would have been
better able to cope with the intrusiveness of the solicitation letters had they not received
them until at least one month after the accident. The State's evidenoe was further
supported by the co-chairman of the Houston Trial Lawyers' Association iind the author
of the 1993 provisions; both testified to numerous complaints of outrage and invasion of
privacy regarding direct mail solicitation.
Based on Florida Bar, we find this evidence sufficient to satisfy the finrt two Central
Hudson prongs....
63 F.3d at 362-63. Presumably, it would be possible to offer similar trial testisrony if there were a
constitutional challenge to the Louisiana waiting-period rule.
118. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 101) S.Ct. 2035, 2041
(1980).
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the construction given to the language, of a state constitution might be more
protective of speech than corresponding provisions of the First Amendment. It
is important, therefore, to consider whether commercial speech (particularly
lawyer advertising) might enjoy greater protection under the free speech guaranty
of'the 'Louisiana Constitution than under the free speech guaranty of the First
Amendment.
Article I, Section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution states: "No law shall
curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. Every person may
speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any subject, but is responsible for
abuse of that freedom.""' This language seems to be at least as broad in its
protection of speech as the language in the federal Constitution. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has indicated that "our state constitution's guarantee of these
liberties was designed to serve the same purpose and provides at least coextensive protection."' 0
A recent decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, 2' however, may
be read to suggest that the Louisiana free speech protections may be even
broader than those under the federal Constitution. In State v. Moses,"~ a case
involving restrictions on the distribution of anonymoust23 political campaign
literature, the appellate court stated:
In view of our own jurisprudence and state constitution, the state
interest required to justify even a limited prohibition on election-related
anonymous literature in Louisiana should be much more compelling
than that which theoretically the U.S. Supreme Court might have found
sufficient in Ohio or elsewhere.""
However, this conclusion appears to have been based, not only on Article 1,
section 7, dealing with freedom of expression, but also on Article 1, section 5,
dealing with the right to privacy. In a later portion of its opinion, the court said
the Louisiana Constitution "contains even stronger language" than the First
Amendment "bearing on freedom of expression and the right to remain

119. La. Const. art. 1, § 7 (1974).
120. See State v. Franzone, 384 So. 2d 409, 411 (La. 1980) (criminal statutes made it illegal for
property owners to knowingly use or lease their premises "for the practice of obscenity"; Louisiana
Supreme Court declared them unconstitutional, as invalid prior restraints on expression).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has frequently cited federal authorities when deciding free

expression cases. See, e.g., Gregory v. Louisiana Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 608 So. 2d 987
(La. 1992); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. St. Romain, 560 So. 2d 820 (La. 1990).
121. State v. Moses, 655 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
122. Id.
123. Campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person responsible
for its contents. Id. at 781.
124. Id. at 782. The Ohio reference relates to McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115S. Ct.
1511 (1995), a United States Supreme Court case that considered the constitutionality of a Ohio
statute prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature.
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anonymous in doing so."' In particular, the court said: "We find that article
1, Section 7, Freedom of Expression, of the Louisiana Constitution when
combined with article 1, Section 5, Right to Privacy, affords stronger protection
' 26
for anonymity in Louisiana than can be found in the U.S. Constitution.'
Of course, even if the Louisiana Constitution is more protective of free
speech in some contexts than the First Amendment, this does not mean that
commercial speech, and, in particular, lawyer speech, is entitled to broader
protection in Louisiana.
2. Gregory v. Louisiana Board of Chiropratic Examiners--A Recent
Commercial Speech Case
There is a fairly recent commercial speech decision by the Louisiana
Supreme Court that sheds some light on the extent to which commercial speech
is entitled to protection under the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution.'27
In Gregory v. Louisiana Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 2 ' the Louisiana
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited "health
care providers" from engaging in direct telephone or mail solicitation of potential
patients that were known to have been involved in a recent accident or
injury.'2" Five chiropractors and a chiropractic clinic challenged the statute as
an infringement on free speech. Prior to the enactment of the statute, the
plaintiffs would purchase accident reports from the police and would send direct
mail solicitations to people who were reported to have been injiured. Wanting
to continue this practice, the plaintiffs brought their claims before the Louisiana
Supreme Court.

125. Moses, 655 So. 2d at 784.
126. Id. at 784. The court quoted other authorities for the proposition that the Louisiana right
to privacy gives a "higher standard of individual liberty than that afforded by the jurisprudence
interpreting the federal constitution." Id. at 785 (quoting State v. Daniels, 631 So. 2d 1281, 1283
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) and State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982)).
127. See Gregory v. Louisiana Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 608 So. ;!d 987 (La. 1992).
128. Id.
129. The statute provided, in pertinent part:
A. A health care provider or person designated, contracted, or paid by the health care
provider, shall not directly solicit by phone or mail, patients or potential patients who,
because of their particular circumstances, are vulnerable to undue influence. Circumstances in which patients or potential patients may be considered to be vulnerable to undue
influence include but are not limited to:
(1) When a person is known to the health care provider to have recently been involved
in a motor vehicle accident.
(2) When a person is known to the health care provider to have recently been involved

in a work-related accident.
(3) When a person is known to the health care provider to have recently been injured by

another person or as a result of another person's actions.
La. R.S. 37:1743 (Supp. 1996).
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The court began its opinion by identifying the dispute as one involving
commercial speech." In the course of its opinion, the court referred to the free
speech provisions of both the Louisiana Constitution and the United States
Constitution."' However, with one exception,'32 every case the court cited was
one that had been decided by the United States Supreme Court. Included were all
of the principal cases to date on lawyer advertising and solicitation.' The court
indicated that the controlling test was the one set forth in CentralHudson."
Applying the Central Hudson test, the court concluded that the State had
advanced two substantial interests in support of its ban on solicitation: (1)
"reducing unnecessary medical treatment and in reducing insurance costs";'35 and
(2) "protecting its citizens from possible overreaching" by health care providers.'36 However, citing Shapero, the court said that "targeted mail solicitations
could generally be regulated by the state through less restrictive and more precise
means than a total ban, such as by requiring submission of letters of solicitation to
a state agency for approval and restricting or penalizing only those letters which
were abusive.""' 7 In the end, the court decided that the "interference with
commercial speech in the statute at issue is broader than is necessary to prevent the
evil feared by the Board. Although telephone solicitation is in-person solicitation
and a total ban on such solicitation may be permissible, such an extensive
restriction on targeted direct mail solicitation is not."' Accordingly, the court
declared the statutory prohibition against targeted mailings to be unconstitutional. 39
There is no indication in the opinion that commercial speech is entitled to more
protection under the Louisiana Constitution than it is under the First Amendment.
To the contrary, the opinion contains a hint of dissatisfaction over the extent to
which the United States Supreme Court has given constitutional protection to

130. 608 So. 2d at 987.
131. Id. at 989.
132. National Funeral Services v. Rockefeller, 870 F. 2d 136 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 966 (1989) (This case upheld some West Virginia statutes that prohibited "in-person and
telephone solicitations of preneed funeral contracts.').
133. The Court discussed, in chronological order, the following cases: Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881, 98 S. Ct. 242 (1977);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447. 98 S. Ct. 1912 (1978); In re Primus. 436 U.S. 412.
98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,.102 S. Ct. 929 (1982); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985); and Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,
486 U.S. 466, 108 S.Ct. 1916 (1988).
134. 608 So. 2d at 989 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n.
447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980)).
135. 608 So. 2d at 992.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 992-93.
138. Id.

139. The plaintiffs had not sought a declaration of unconstitutionality with respect to the
restriction on telephone solicitations. Id.
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lawyer advertising. Discussing the Bates case, the Court empha!;ized the dissent
of Justice Powell:
In dissent Justice Powell argued that advertising of undefined "routine
legal services" is vastly different from price advertising of a standardized
product such as the prepackaged prescription drugs in the Virginia
Pharmacy Board case. The advertising of professional services also
implicates the vastly increased potential for deception and the enhanced
difficulty of effective regulation in the public interest. The dissenter
concluded that the great risk ofpublic deception was not jus:ified by the
marginal First Amendment interests involved."
Earlier in its opinion, the court said that "potential for misleading and deception is
particularly significant in advertising for professional services."" Underscoring
this point, Justice Lemmon wrote a concurring opinion in which he indicated that
his views on professional advertising were closer to those of the dissenting justices
in recent Supreme Court cases on lawyer advertising." 2
The Gregory opinion may also contain another hint about the Louisiana
Supreme Court's views on commercial speech restrictions, one that is pertinent to
the issues involved in the recent amendment to Rule 7.2. Near the end of its
opinion, the Court listed some examples of restrictions on solicitation letters that
the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners could permissibly impose:
For example, the Board may consider requiring that all letters be
prominently identified as an ADVERTISEMENT; that al letters be
submitted to the Board for approval before mailing; that copies of all
letters be retained by the sender for a reasonable period; and t1at the letter

140.
141.

Id. at 990.
Id.

142.

He stated:

I believe, along with the dissenters in those cases (Zauderer and Shaper], that greater

deference should be accorded to the state's legitimate effort to regulate advertising for
professional services because of the vastly greater difficulty for a lay pe.on to evaluate
the quality of professional services than the quality of standardized cons-tmer products.
and because the consequences of a mistaken evaluation ofa "free sample" of professional

services may be much more serious.
The medical profession, like the legal profession, is founded on a service orientation

rather than a commercial orientation. The sad commentary on lawyer advertising isthat
the accompanying dramatic increase in emphasis on commercialism in the practice of law
has led to a corresponding decline in professionalism. The fact that many professionally
oriented lawyers have been forced into advertising in order to meet the competition only
compounds the general problem that advertising for professional services frequently tends
to mislead more than to inform. This is an area where an absolute bar on personal contact
for solicitation of employment may be required by the substantial governmental interest
involved.
Id. at 993-94.
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advise the recipient ofthe importance ofemploying a health care provider
and suggest inquiry into the provider's qualifications and experience."4 3
Immediately. after these suggestions, in the same paragraph, the Court added:
"Moreover, the question whether the Board may impose a ban on written
solicitations to an accident victim for a specified reasonable period immediately
following the accident is not presented in this case."'" In context with the
preceding "suggestions," and in light ofthe reference to a "reasonable period" for
the ban, this sentence seems to signal an absence of hostility to a waiting period
rule for targeted mail solicitations by chiropractors.
This "signal" (if that is what it is) in the Gregory opinion was given in a case
involving chiropractors, but most of the cases that the Louisiana Supreme Court
relied on were United States Supreme Court cases dealing with lawyer advertising
and solicitation. Presumably, if the Court were willing to consider a waiting period
rule for chiropractor solicitation letters, it would be willing to consider one for
solicitation letters written by lawyers. Of course, in 1996, the court adopted an
amendment to Rule 7.2 that included such a ban. There is little reason to think that
the Court would find that ban more vulnerable to an attack under the free speech
provisions of the Louisiana Constitution than under the provisions of the First
Amendment.
V. THE WAITING PERIOD AND ATTORNEY BEHAVIOR

How will the new rule affect the behavior of Louisiana lawyers? It seems
reasonably certain that some Louisiana lawyers have, in the past, mailed targeted
solicitation letters to accident or disaster victims, or their surviving relatives, within
thirty days of the accident or the disaster.' Lawyers who used to do this, who
are familiar with the new rule, and who wish to comply with it (or sufficiently fear
the consequences of not complying with it), can be expected to avoid mailing
targeted solicitation letters to accident or disaster victims, or their relatives, within
the thirty-day period. These lawyers may not send solicitation letters at all, or if
they do, they may send them after the end ofthe period.
Some lawyers may continue to mail targeted solicitation letters contrary to the
provisions of the new rule. These lawyers would fall into one of two categories.
First, there could be some lawyers who do not know about the new rule and, out of
ignorance, mail targeted solicitation letters within the thirty-day period.'"6 It

143.
144.

Id. at 993 n.8.
Id.

145. A New Orleans-based newspaper reported: "The practice is pervasive, as any victim of a
well-publicized accident can attest. Before the bandages are off, letters of solicitation appear in the
mailbox." Braking Ambulance Chasers, New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 24, 1996, at.B6.
146. A lawyer who does not know of the existence of the rule might be expected to articulate
his or her ignorance as a mitigating factor in discipline. There is some authority for the proposition
that misconduct arising from "negligence or oversight is... less egregious than that deriving from
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would be surprising, however, if there were many lawyers who do personal injury
work who have not heard about the rule.
A second category ofnon-complying lawyers could be described as "marginally-ethical." These would be lawyers who know about the rule, and who choose to
violate it because they care more about obtaining clients than about complying with
the rule, and because they believe that they will obtain clients by -violatingthe rule
that they would not otherwise obtain. There will probably not be many lawyers in
this category either, for at least two reasons.' 7 First, even if there are a fair
number of lawyers who would subordinate rule compliance to client-getting, they
would probably realize that, by mailing a targeted solicitation letter, they would
create a paper trail of non-compliance with an ethics rule. The post-mark alone
would evidence the non-compliance. Unless they believe that the disciplinary
authorities would not enforce the rule, or would not enforce it seriously, such
lawyers would probably hesitate to create the negative evidence that would arise
from non-compliance.
Second, there are other ways to approach the potential clients. One way to
approach accident victims is to engage in direct solicitation, either by live telephone
contact, or by in-person visit. Both types of solicitation are clearly unethical,
regardless of when they occur." However, anecdotal reports, and even some
newspaper accounts, indicate that such solicitation efforts do occur." 9 A
potential downside to the new rule is that it might incline marginally-ethical
lawyers to give up targeted mailings and shift to these more obnoxious forms of
obtaining new clients. Marginally-ethical lawyers, who desire to contact accident
victims but who are anxious to avoid a negative paper trail, might choose to engage
in these forms of solicitation within the thirty-day period. 5 °
Butthere are other, more appropriate, options available as we'll. Attorneys who
used to send immediate targeted mailings to accident victims and who desire to
attract accident victims as clients could always turn to conventional advertising.
The rules permit various forms of advertising,'5 ' and it is clear hat at least some

an intent to engage in prohibited conduct" See In re Anonymous, 637 N.E.2d 131, 132 (Ind. 1994).
147. One hopes that there are not very many "marginally-ethical" lawyers to begin with.
148.

See La. R.S. 37, Ch. 4 App., Art. 16, Rule 7.2(a) (Supp. 1996). At least they are unethical

when the persons being solicited have no prior professional or family relationship with the lawyer
and where a significant motive for the solicitation is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. Id.
149. See, e.g., Susan Finch, Mother Helps Legal Sting, New Orleans Times Picayune, July 12,
1996, at Al; Braking Ambulance Chasers, New Orleans Times Picayune, Jan. 24, 1996, at B6;
Edward Pratt, Lawyers Try To Improve Image, Saturday State Times, March 9. 1996, at 7B; Milford
Fryer, New Restriction On Lawyers Was Needed Step, Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, March 10,
1996, at 7B.
150. Of course, even telephone solicitation and in-person solicitation may create evidentiary

trails, such as business cards or recorded telephone discussions. See, e.g., In re D'Amico, 668 So.
2d 730 (La. 1996) (per curiam) (attorney subject to disciplinary hearing based on conversation
recorded by a telephone answering machine). Even if there were no paptr trail, a disgruntled
prospective client could provide testimony about the solicitation in a disciplinary hearing.
151. See Rules 7.2 & 7.3.
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forms ofadvertising help attract new clients. is2 Lawyer television advertisements
are commonplace. "Untargeted" mass mailings, which constitute a form of
permissible advertising, would not be subject to the thirty-day waiting period.
It appears that there are even some forms of"targeted" solicitation of accident
victims that would not be covered by the thirty-day rule. Rule 7.2(b) permits
attorneys to use written or recorded messages to solicit business from "persons
known to need legal services of a particular kind," so long as certain requirements
are met. For example, a recorded solicitation may be used, if a copy is retained by
the lawyer, if it identifies a lawyer responsible for its content, if it is identified as
an "advertisement," and if it meets certain other requirements set forth in Rules 7.1
and 7.2. But the new thirty-day rule expressly applies only to "written" communications. As a result, it seems that a lawyer would not violate the new rule if he or
she walked up to the door of an accident victim, hung a recorded solicitation
message on the doorknob, and left without encountering anyone." 3 Similarly, to
the extent current technology permits, it would seem permissible for a lawyer to
engage the services of a computer to make a telephone call to an accident victim,
and deliver a recorded solicitation message over the telephone. It appears that a
lawyer could even mail a recorded solicitation message to an accident victim within
the thirty-day period, so long as no "written communication" were included.
The language ofthe rule might even permit a type ofwritten solicitation within
the thirty-day period. Although 7.2(b)(3) imposes a thirty-day waiting period on
written communications, the pertinent portion of the rule references mailing. It

152. Some Alabama lawyers were disciplined because their advertising brought in more business
than they could competently handle. See Davis v. Alabama State Bar, 676 So. 2d 306 (Ala. 1996).
153. At least that would seem to be the result unless the language of Rule 7.2(a) could be
somehow be said to cover this as an "in person" solicitation. The rule should not be read that way.
The first portion ofLouisiana Rule 7.2 states: "Alawyer shall not solicit professional employment
in person, by person to person verbal telephone contact or though others acting at his request..."
This is slightly different from the corresponding language in ABAModel Rule 7.3: "Alawyer shall
not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit professional employment ....
" The "in-person...
contact" language from the Model Rule seems to describe a "person-to-person" solicitation
scenario--one in which the attorney solicits business from a person who isin his presence, or who
is within earshot. The "in-person" language from the Louisiana version is somewhat less clear in this
respect.
Does the difference in the language matter? It would, if the "in person" reference in the Louisiana
rule were thought to cover more than the standard "person to person" solicitation situation described
in the foregoing paragraph. Thus, it might be argued that the "in person" reference should be read
to prohibit that "person" (the attorney) from being involved in the delivery of any communication
that solicits clients. But that would be a rather strange result. In the first place, such a reading
would also be broad enough to cover "person to person verbal telephone contact," rendering that
portion of the Rule unnecessary. Second, such a broad reading would prohibit activities that are
expressly permitted under part (b) of the Rule. That is because an attorney who engages in the
activities permitted under part (b) of Rule 7.2 would certainly be involved, to some extent, in
delivering a message of solicitation. At the very least, the attorney would complete a written
communication, and would initiate the delivery process by taking it to a secretary for mailing, or by
taking it directly to a mail slot or a post office. Obviously, the language of part (a) of the rule should
not be read to prohibit the activities that are expressly permitted in part (b).
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states that "such communication shall not be initiated by the lawyer unless the
accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the
communication." It might be argued that the language of the rul applies only to
written solicitations that are mailed. If that is so, then the rule would not prohibit
a lawyer from hanging a written solicitation letter on the accident victim's
doorknob within the thirty-day period. Whether or not this is a reasonable reading
of the Rule,"s it would, of course, be impermissible for the lawyer to engage in
"in person" solicitation if someone came to the door before the lawyer departed.
Would lawyers actually use some ofthese other, apparently permissible, means
to solicit business from "targeted" accident or disaster victims within the thirty-day
period? The guess here is that some lawyers will try to do so. But there are some
practical problems that may discourage their use. Even if it were permissible for
a lawyer to engage in targeted solicitation within the thirty-day period, by, for
example, placing a recorded message on the doorknob of an accident victim, the
lawyer would find that this is more labor-intensive than sending a targeted
solicitation letter by mail. The lawyer may also fear, with good reason, that an
accident victim, or surviving relative, would be less pleased to find a lawyer
communication hanging on his or her front door than to find it in the mailbox. A
hostile recipient would probably not want to be a client. There would also be the
risk that a lawyer (or an agent of the lawyer) who goes to the fi'ont door would
actually encounter someone there. It would be odd and uncomfortable for the
lawyer to say nothing in that circumstance. On the other hand, if the lawyer says
anything meaningful about why he or she has come to the front door, or even if the
lawyer simply hands over the recording, the lawyer might then be guilty of
prohibited in-person solicitation. The latter risk could be avoided if the lawyer
were able to have a targeted solicitation message transmitted over the telephone by
some sort of machine. But a machine solicitation might be relatiively difficult to
arrange, would almost certainly be fairly unimpressive to the hearer, and might, in
any event, be received by someone other than the intended "target."
VI. CONCLUSION

The recent amendment to Louisiana's Rule 7.2 makes it unethical for
Louisiana lawyers to engage in a previously permissible form of targeted
solicitation of clients. As of March 1, 1996, they may no longer mail solicitation
letters to accident or disaster victims, or their relatives, within thirty days of the
accident or disaster. Within the thirty-day period, lawyers are still free to engage
in conventional advertising. They may also engage in forms oftargeted solicitation
that are not covered by the thirty-day restriction, provided, of course, that they
comply with the other rules relevant to advertising and solicitaticn.
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Another, less persuasive, reading of the rule is that it requires all ",written communica-

tions" to accident victims or their relatives to be mailed, but then it prohibits 1he communications

from being mailed during the waiting period.
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There is an issue about the constitutionality ofthe new rule. The United States
Supreme Court approved a similar restriction on Florida lawyers, in part because
a two-year study by the Florida State Bar established, to the satisfaction of the
Court, that the restriction directly and materially advanced a substantial interest.
From 1991-1993, Louisiana undertook its own review of lawyer advertising and
solicitation rules. However, unlike Florida, Louisiana did not undertake formal
surveys relative to the solicitation letter issue, and, as a result, it does not seem that
Louisiana would be able to make a statistical showing in support of its rule
comparable to the one that Florida generated in the Went For It case. But the
Louisiana study apparently did gather negative anecdotal information on targeted
solicitation letters. And the Louisiana authorities had the WentForItdecision, with
its detailed references to the Florida study, before them at the time they acted. The
United States Supreme Court has indicated that restrictions on speech may be
supported by reliance on studies from other locations. Such reliance here could
well enable Louisiana's new rule to pass constitutional muster.
Louisiana's thirty-day rule should have a definite effect on lawyer behavior:
lawyers who comply with the rule will no longer mail targeted solicitation letters
to accident victims within the thirty-day period. On the negative side, it is possible
that the new rule could incline marginally-ethical lawyers to engage in prohibited
in-person solicitation or person-to-person telephonic solicitation. But it is more
likely that lawyers who desire to represent accident or disaster victims will turn to
permissible ways to reach them, such as conventional advertising, or perhaps in
some cases, forms of targeted solicitation that are not expressly prohibited by the
rules.

